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CLIMBING OUT OF THE HOLE: SUNSETS,
SUBJECTIVE VALUE, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND
THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW
Julian Morris*
"de gustibus non disputandum est"
"One man's meat is another man's poison"
THE PRODUCTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL AMENITIES
At sunset on a clear summer's day, the view to the West from my
parent's house is always stunning: London ensconced in a beautiful
orange glow, the result of the Sun's late afternoon rays diffracting
through the hazy atmosphere. I have often wondered what value my
parents and their neighbours in South Essex put on this hazy vision,
so humbly maintained by industrialists and vehicle users.
Those individuals living by the side of London's clogged arteries
no doubt have a different view of these emissions. One might specu-
late that many of these people would be happier if they had a little
less ozone with their breakfast. Additionally, we must not forget the
industrialists and vehicle users who benefit directly from their haze-
producing activities.
With so many different interests at stake, how can we decide how
much haze to allow? Two popular views are those espoused by "en-
vironmentalists" and "economists."1 The standard environmentalist
* MA (Economics) Edinburgh, 1992; MSc (Environment and
Resource Economics) University College London, 1993; MPhil
(Land Economics) Cambridge University, 1995; Graduate Diploma
(Law), University of Westminster, 1999. Visiting Professor, De-
partment of International Studies, University of Buckingham, Eng-
land; Research Fellow, Institute of Economic Affairs, London; Di-
rector, International Policy Network, London.
1. The discussion here presents something of a caricature of what
economists and environmentalists tend to say about the subject. The
author applauds those environmentalists and economists who object
343
344 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LA W JOURNAL
response is to demand regulations that would drastically limit emis-
sions by vehicles and industry. In contrast, the standard economist
response is to identify the "socially optimal" level of emissions and
construct a rational system of taxes and tradable permits that would
lead to this outcome in an efficient manner. Both "solutions" are
problematic.
The environmentalist response presumes that all emissions are
harmful and that there are essentially no beneficial effects arising
from industry and vehicle use, even at the margin.2 To the environ-
mentalist, the optimal level of emissions is zero.
The economist response is in many ways more reasonable than that
of the environmentalist. It is unlikely that all members of society,
even a simple majority, would want to eliminate emissions alto-
gether (at least, not if it involves increased costs or reduced income).
Even those who favor significant reductions in emissions in some
places might think that emissions in other places (for example, in
places where no person is adversely affected) would be perfectly
acceptable. But the economist's solution begins with the assumption
that it is possible to achieve the "optimal" level of emissions through
the actions of an all-powerful central regulator.3 Given the subjective
to this caricature and hopes they will encourage others to think less
narrowly.
2. To extremist environmentalists, the orange haze would, by
virtue of its unnatural origin, be condemned as aesthetically undesir-
able.
3. For example, the economists might try to conduct surveys to
establish each householder's willingness to pay for cleaner air or
better sunsets. However, the evidence suggests that the numbers
would be of little merit. The best that could be hoped for is that the
surveys would rank the importance individuals and groups attach to
various concerns. See, e.g. Don L Coursey, The Revealed Demand
for a Public Good: Evidence from Endangered and Threatened Spe-
cies, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 411 (1981); Daniel Kahneman & Jack L.
Knetch, Valuing Public Goods: The Purchase of Moral Satisfaction,
22 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 57 (1992). The problem, at base, with
such surveys is that they do not, indeed cannot, replicate the mental
processes that occur when a person makes a decision to buy or sell a
good - so the values they obtain are not "prices." For an explanation
of how prices arise and their function in coordinating economic ac-
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nature of desires (as exemplified above by the aesthetes who appre-
ciate man-made sunsets over cities), it is not even possible for the
state to identify the "optimal" level of Follution, let alone construct
laws that will bring this optimum about.
The problem is a little bit like that faced by a heating engineer at-
tempting to ensure that each room of a house is at the right tempera-
ture. The first houses with central heating typically had one thermo-
stat that would govern when the heating was on or off. The problem
was that each room had different thermal properties - some had big
windows, others small windows; some had high ceilings, others low
ceilings. So - especially when doors were closed - the thermostat
would ensure that the room in which it was placed was kept at the
"right" temperature, while most other rooms would be too hot or too
cold. Heating engineers have since realized that the best way to en-
able each room to be kept at the optimal temperature is to put indi-
vidual thermostats on each radiator.
Just as decentralization of temperature control results in better,
more effective temperature management, a growing body of schol-
arly literature suggests that many environmental amenities may be
provided better, and more effectively, through decentralized institu-
tions rather than through central government intervention. 5 Coin-
tivity, see F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM.
ECON. REV. 519, (1945).
4. The economist solution also typically ignores - or intention-
ally avoids - the issue of compensating losers. The standard by
which actions are judged by such economists is "potential Pareto
optimality," under which it is enough that the winners could com-
pensate the losers, not that they would actually so do. WILLIAM J.
BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY (1988); see also Mark Sagoff, Four Dogmas of Environ-
mental Economics, 3 ENVTL. VALUES 284 (1994). So, in the above
example, if the central authority decides that the householders in
Essex gain more from particulate pollution than Londoners lose, then
it is sufficient that the Essex folk could in principle compensate the
Londoners. (The main argument used in favor of this standard is that
it obviates the problem of transaction costs associated with both the
collection of revenue from beneficiaries and their disbursement to
losers.)
5. Such literature can be traced back at least to Ronald Coase,
The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960), which cri-
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mon law liability for environmental damage, 6 combined with con-
tracts, 7 easements and covenants 8 would, this literature suggests, in
many if not most cases be more effective in providing the kinds of
environmental amenities that people actually want. The purpose of
this short article is to assess the success of one such institution in
enabling people to protect the environment in England and Wales. 9
tiques the unilateral nature of the "externality" as conceptualized in
particular by Arthur Pigou. Coase argues that externalities are "re-
ciprocal" and is concerned that the unilateral theory espoused by
Pigou serves to promote an unjustified view of the role of the state in
correcting market "defects": "It is my belief that economists, and
policy-makers generally, have tended to overestimate the advantages
which come from government regulation." Id. at 18.
6. See e.g. COASE, supra note 5, who shows that liability rules
affect the structure of property rights; See also Guido Calabresi & A.
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienabil-
ity: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARVARD L. REV. 1089 (1972);
Stephen C. Littlechild, The Problem of Social Cost, in NEW
DIRECTIONS IN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 77-93 (Louis Spardo, ed.,
1979); Steven Cheung, The Myth of Social Cost, 1978 LONDON:
INST. OF ECON. AFF.; Hugh H. Macaulay, Liability and Environ-
mental Quality, in THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF LIABILITY
RULES (Roger E. Meiners & Bruce Yandle eds., 1991); BRUCE
YANDLE, COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW FOR THE
ENVIRONMENT (1997).
7. In principle all amenities could be provided through contract.
See Mark Pennington, Liberating the Land, 2002 LONDON: INST. OF
ECON. AFF.
8. Robert Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nui-
sance Rules and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV.
681 (1973).
9. Although Wales now has its own Assembly, it continues to
share with England a common legal system. However, for simplic-
ity's sake I shall refer to this system as the English Common Law.
Moreover, unless otherwise stated, I use Common Law to describe
the law developed both in the Courts of Common Pleas, Queen"s
Bench and Exchequer (collectively known as the Law courts) and in
the Courts of Chancery (the court of Equity) - which were merged in
1875.
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This article focuses on the role of private nuisance law, which is
the branch of law that has traditionally dealt with ongoing interfer-
ences with private property. It begins with a discussion of the origins
of nuisance and its development during the seventeenth and eight-
eenth centuries. It is hoped that by offering a historical backdrop,
the confusion that often clouds discussion of nuisance - and espe-
cially the claim that nuisance is (or at least was) not guided by clear
principles - will be avoided. Some of the key developments during
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are then adumbrated. Finally,
some observations are made concerning the applicability of nuisance
to contemporary environmental problems and some thoughts are
given on possible reforms that might improve the utility of nuisance
to such problems. 10
EARLY DEVELOPMENTS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF SIC UTERE TUO UT IN
ALIENUM NON LAEDAS1
The nuisance action has its origins in the assize of novel dis-
seisin, 2 a remedy created by Henry II in 1166 to protect the posses-
10. The intention is not specifically to contrast these institutions
with the alternatives - such as regulations, taxes and permits. For an
excellent recent comparison of the role of common law with regula-
tion, the reader is directed to David Howarth, Muddying the Waters:
Tort Law and the Environment, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 469 (2002)
11. The following discussion draws extensively on Joel Franklin
Brenner, Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution, 3 J. LEGAL
STUD. 403 (1973); A.I. Ogus & G.M. Richardson, Economics and
the Environment: A Study of Private Nuisance, 36 CAMBRIDGE L.J.
284 (1977); Daniel R. Coquillette, Mosses from an old Manse: An-
other Look at Some Historic Property Cases About the Environment,
64 CORNELL L. REV. 761 (1979); and John P.S. McLaren, Nuisance
Law and he Industrial Revolution - Some Lessons from Social His-
tory, 3 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 155 (1981).
12. Here, we are tracing nuisance back only to its proximal me-
dieval origins; there is evidence that Roman Law also employed
similar rules, and probably the customary courts of England and
other countries would have applied somewhat similar rules. The As-
size of Novel Disseisin, for example, replaced the older "writs of
right" COQUILLETrE, supra note 11, at 765-766.
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sion of freeholders, and which entailed a trial by a jury of "twelve
free and lawful men of that neighbourhood."'' 3 An early case, from
1201, involved Simon of Merston, who complained of problems
caused by his neighbour Jordan's mill pool. The judge ruled that
Simon had been disseised of some attribute of his freehold and or-
dered the destruction of the mill pool.
14
However, an assize of nuisance was not available merely because
the plaintiff had experienced damage, as Daniel Coquillette notes:
"To be actionable, a nuisance must result in both injuria (legal in-
jury) and damnum (material damage)." These concepts were distin-
guished by Bracton: "if you built a mill on your land, taking custom-
ers from my mill, there was damnum to me but no injuria."'5 The
implication here is that the law was unwilling to view pure economic
loss, without any associated interference with a right, as an action-
able nuisance. Coquillette offers that a necessary element of injuria
was omne id quod non iure fit ("anything wrongfully done"). He
then points out that the "meaning of this crucial phrase was unclear
for centuries; perhaps there was no uniform definition."
By 1443, things had been cleared up sufficiently for Judge
Markam to assert that "if a man builds a house and stops up the light
coming to my house, or causes rain to fall from his house and so un-
dermines my house, or does anything which injures my free tene-
ment, I shall have the assize of nuisance."' 6 In other words, the as-
size of nuisance protected the rights of landowners to use and enjoy
their property free from interference by others.
From 1601, the assize of nuisance was joined by a new action "on
the case". 17 Although the former had the advantage that it enabled
property owners to request an abatement, it was only available to
13. 3 BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 194
(Samuel E. Thorne trans., 1977).
14. "Jordan the miller has within the time of the assize unjustly
and without a judgement raised his mill pool in Weston to the nui-
sance of Simon"s freehold. The jurors say he has so raised the pool.
Judgement: that the pool be destroyed and that Jordan be in mercy
one half-mark. Damages, three shilling." 62 Selden Society, cited
and translated by Brenner, supra note 11, at 404.
15. COQUILLETTE, supra note 11, at 769.
16. Id. at 770.
17. This new action was established in the case of Cantrel v.
Church, 78 Eng. Rep. 1072 (Ex Ch. 1601).
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freeholders, whereas actions on the case were available both to free-
holders and lesser tenants (such as leaseholders). Case entitled the
successful plaintiff only to damages, but if the nuisance persisted the
plaintiff could request an injunction in equity. 18 Thus case, having a
wider appeal, soon became the dominant form of action for nui-
sance. 19
An action brought in 1608 by William Aldred at the Norfolk As-
sizes concerned a pigsty built by Aldred's neighbor Thomas Benton.
The pigsty was adjacent to Aldred's house and had created a stink.2 °
Benton argued in his defence that "the building of the house for hogs
was necessary for the sustenance of man, and one ought not to have
so delicate a nose, that he cannot bear the smell of hogs." ' How-
ever, this attempt to use a "public benefit" argument failed and the
judge ruled in Aldred's favor.
Sir Edward Coke used Aldred's case to clarify the rule: property
holders have a right to use and enjoy their property free from inter-
ference, but the extent of this right is only that of ordinary comfort
and necessity, not delicate taste.2 Once it has been established that a
right has been breached, no putative "public benefit" will justify the
damnum. Here, Coke employed the Roman Maxim "sic utere tuo ut
alienum non laedas" (so use your own property as not to injure your
neighbours). 23 The sic utere rule was employed in numerous seven-teenth century cases, including Jones v. Powell,24 Morley v. Prag-
18. BRENNER, supra note 11, at 406. Here we are reminded of the
strict separation that existed between the Courts of Common Pleas
(the common law courts) and the Courts of Chancery (the courts of
equity) until the late nineteenth Century - the distinction was abol-
ished by Parliament in 1873.
19. As Coquillette observes, "the careful plaintiff would always
allege in case, so that lack of free tenement could not be argued at
bar. Thus the assize of nuisance, although it historically preceded all
actions on the case, was assimilated into the action on the case after
1601." COQUILLETrE, supra note 11, at 775.
20. Aldred's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 816,(K.B. 1611).
21. Id.
22. Id. "In a house four things are desired [habitation of man,
pleasure of the inhabitant, necessity of light, and cleanliness of air],
and for nuisance done to three of them an action lies" Id.
23. Aldred's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (K.B. 1611).
24. 123 Eng. Rep. 1155 (C.P. 1628).
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nel,25 and Tuberville v. Stamp,26 and was famously restated by Lord
Holt in the 1704 case of Tennant v. Goldwin: "every man must so
use his own as not to damnify another."'27 Blackstone's affirmative
expression of the sic utere tuo rule suggests that through the mid-
eighteenth century it held sway and was commonly applied to harms
that have a distinctly modem environmental feel to them:
[I]f one erects a smelting house for lead so near the land
of another that the vapor and smoke kills his corn and
grass, and damages his cattle therein, this is held to be a
nuisance... [I]f one does any other act, in itself lawful,
which yet being done in that place necessarily tends to
the damage of another's property, it is a nuisance: for it is
incumbent on him to find some other place to do that act
where it will be less offensive.
28
PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENTS: ACQUIRING THE RIGHT TO POLLUTE BY
PRIOR APPROPRIATION
While sic utere tuo was the rule, there were exceptions. In the
1791 case of R. v. Neville,29 the British Crown brought a case in pub-
lic nuisance against a "maker of kitchen stuff and other grease" for
fouling the air. But Neville had been carrying on his trade for some
25. 79 Eng. Rep. 1039 (K.B. 1638).
26. 88 Eng. Rep. 1228 (K.B. 1697).
27. Tennant v. Goldwin, 92 Eng Rep. 222 (K.B. 1705). Goldwin
had failed to maintain an adjoining wall, causing a stink from his
privy to enter Tennant"s house, which affected Tennant"s enjoyment
of his property. Lord Holt, finding for Tennant, concluded "And as
every man is bound so to look to his cattle, as to keep them out of his
neighbours ground... so he must keep in the filth of his house or of-
fice, that it may not flow in upon and damnify his neighbour." Id. at
224.
28. 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries, *217-218.
29. 170 Eng. Rep. 102 (1791).
30. The public nuisance is a separate action to the private nui-
sance. It relates to harms to the general public and is primarily en-
forced by the Crown, although individuals may also argue a case in
public nuisance if the extent of harm they suffer is greater than that
suffered by other members of the public.
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time without objection from his neighbors and Lord Kenyon advised
the jury that "where manufacturers have been borne within a
neighbourhood for many years, it will operate as a consent of the
inhabitants to their being carried on, though the law might have con-
sidered them as nuisances, had they been objected to in time.",3' The
jury acquitted the defendant. Following this reasoning, a person may
acquire a prescriptive right to cause harm to neighboring properties
even though, if actioned, the harms would be considered a nuisance.
This rule (developed in a public nuisance case) was affirmed but
constrained in the 1838 (private nuisance) case of Bliss v. Hale,32 in
which a plaintiff complained of noxious smells and vapors arising
from the works of a tallow chandler, which allegedly interfered with
the plaintiffs beneficial use of his property. The court ruled that
since the defendant had only been causing the nuisance for three
years, he had not acquired a prescriptive easement to continue, for
which at least 20 years continuous operation would have been neces-
sary. In Sturges v. Bridgeman,33 the courts made clear that the harm
itself, not merely the action causing the harm, must have continued
for a period of 20 years in order for a right to have been acquired by
prescription.
THE PLANNING FUNCTION OF NUISANCE LAW
In R. v. Neville, Lord Kenyon offered the observation that the con-
sent to pollute would not apply to a newcomer who made the air
"very disagreeable and uncomfortable." 34 This was taken to imply
that a newcomer whose actions made only a marginal difference to
air quality would not be liable for their portion of the harm caused to
neighboring properties. 35 The case of Sturges v. Bridgeman,36 has
been well described by Ronald Coase:
37
In this case, a confectioner...used two mortars and pes-
tles in connection with his business (one had been in op-
31. 170 Eng. Rep. 102 (1791).
32. 7 Eng. Rep. 122 (1838).
33. 11 Eng. Rep. 852, at 865 (Ch. D. 1879).
34. 170 Eng. Rep. 102 (1791).
35. Id.
36. 11 Eng. Rep. 852 (Ch. D. 1879)
37. COASE, supra note 5, at 8-9.
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eration in the same position for more than 60 years and
the other for more than 26 years). A doctor then came to
occupy neighbouring premises. ... The confectioner's
machinery caused the doctor no harm until, eight years
after he had first occupied the premises [that is, 34 years
after the youngest pestle and mortar was first put into op-
eration], he built a consulting room at the end of his gar-
den right against the confectioner's kitchen. It was then
found that the noise and vibration caused by the confec-
tioner's machinery made it difficult for the doctor to use
his new consulting room. ... The doctor therefore brought
a legal action to force the confectioner to stop using his
machinery.
The courts, granting an injunction to the doctor, remarked:
Whether anything is to be considered a nuisance or not is
a question to be determined not merely by an abstract
consideration of the thing itself, but in reference to its
circumstances. What would be a nuisance in Belgrave
Square (then and now a high-class residential district in
London's West End) would not necessarily be so in Ber-
mondsey (an area on the South side of the Thames, then
full of tanneries).38
In other words, nuisance law could provide a land-use planning, or
"zoning", function,3 9 dictating where an activity can or cannot take
place. By establishing clear and readily enforceable property rights
38. 11 Eng. Rep. 852 (Ch. D. 1879).
39. See Colls v. Home and Colonial Stores, 1904 A.C. 179 ("a
dweller in towns cannot be expected to have as pure air, as free from
smoke, smell, and noise as if he lived in the country, and distant
from other dwellings, and yet an excess of smoke, smell and noise
may give a cause of action, but in each case it becomes a matter of
degree").
40. Coase points out that the two parties would have been free to
bargain around this judgement - the Doctor selling his right to
peaceful enjoyment of his property to the sweet manufacturer - if
they so wished. This point is important but, nevertheless, if such a
bargain were struck it would not have affected the general right, as a
resident of the West End of London, to be free from the noise of pes-
tles and mortars, so the planning function of the law would remain.
(Although, presumably, a point would come where so many defen-
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in this way, nuisance law enabled parties to strike the balance be-
tween environmental amenities and cost. People buying a property
in the West End knew that they had a right to be free from air pollu-
tion, noise and other interferences. People buying property in Ber-
mondsey knew that they would not be able to take an action against
a marginal polluter. The differences in property prices in these dis-
tricts no doubt reflected the differences in amenities.
Nuisance law also contains an efficiency aspect. In areas where
nuisance-type interferences are rare, as in Berkeley Square and
Wimpole Street, it is more efficient to grant injunctions against those
who cause a nuisance, since the transaction costs of bargaining will
be relatively low. By contrast, in areas such as Bermondsey, where
there are many parties causing nuisance-type interferences, the im-
position of an injunction against one party seems iniquitous, yet the
imposition of an injunction against all would cause great problems.
The transaction costs of bargaining would be very high and if, as a
result, many firms were to close, the costs to the local people could
be great. 41 Moreover, as a neighborhood becomes less industrial,
judges may look more favorably on claims that an individual source
of noise or noxious emission constitutes a nuisance. In this context,
the English principle that coming to a nuisance is no defence, so
clearly propounded in Sturges v. Bridgeman, helps those seeking to
improve the environmental amenities in an area that was formerly
industrial.42
dants had bargained around their respective injunctions that the
character of the area would have changed.) COASE, supra note 5.
41. If many firms were faced with injunctions, they would have to
bargain with each of the affected parties, which may be time con-
suming and expensive - and most likely some parties would simply
refuse any compensation. In the absence of low-cost abatement tech-
nologies, the only alternative for many firms might be to move the
plant elsewhere.
42. Another option for improving the environment in an area
"zoned" for industrial use would be for those affected by the pollu-
tion to bargain with the companies. However, the coordination costs
of such an activity might be high. Moreover, the bargaining power of
those so affected would probably be weak since the very nature of
places that are "zoned" for industrial use implies that the residents
are poor.
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Finally, the establishment of property rights through decentralized
private nuisance actions, is arguably both more equitable and more
efficient than the creation of rights through a system of administra-
tive planning. In the latter system, state administrators decide a pri-
ori where industry can locate and bargaining cannot take place, be-
cause rights created by administrative planning are inalienable.
REASONABLENESS AND THE DUTY OF CARE IN NUISANCE
In the late 1850s there was a brief attempt to expand on the propo-
sitions argued in R. v. Neville and Bliss v. Hale into a broader doc-
trine of reasonableness.
The most extreme case was Hole v. Barlow,43 which concerned a
brickmaker who had allegedly caused a smoke nuisance. At trial,
the judge asked the court to consider whether the brickmaker had
established his facility in "a convenient and proper place," suggest-
ing that if this was so then no action would lie. This was affirmed at
appeal and elaborated to include not only reasonableness of location
but also of operation - a concept introduced from the nascent law of
negligence. However, subsequent decisions questioned the author-
ity of Hole v. Barlow, and in Bamford v. Turnley,45 another case of
smoke from a brickmaker, the reasoning in Hole was explicitly re-
jected because it departed from the sic utere tuo principle.
In St. Helen's Smelting Co. v. Tipping,46 a distinction was drawn
between interference with property and interference with peaceful
enjoyment. In 1859, Mr. Tipping purchased a 1300 acre estate in the
town of St. Helen's in Merseyside. Four years later he brought an
action against the defendants, alleging that their nearby copper
smelting works had (1) caused injury to trees, hedges, fruit and cattle
on his land, and (2) caused substantial personal discomfort.47 The
judge in the lower court instructed the jury that the law was not con-
cerned with "trifling inconveniences" and that where noxious vapors
were concerned "the injury to be actionable must be such as visibly
to diminish the value of the property and the comfort and enjoyment
43. 140 Eng. Rep. 1113 (C.P. 1858).
44. Id.; See also McLaren, supra note 11, at 174.
45. 122 Eng. Rep. 25 (Ex. 1862).
46. 11 Eng. Rep. 1483 (H.L. 1865).
47. Id.
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of it." The jury awarded damages of £361 to Tipping. The Lords
upheld the judgement but qualified it by clearly distinguishing be-
tween damage to the property itself, which would be actionable re-
gardless of where the property was located, and interference with the
beneficial use of that property, which would depend on the location
of the property (and in this case was not available because of the
industrial setting).
Although the rule in nuisance law remained sic utere tuo, its inter-
pretation, and specifically whether there can be said to be damnum,
in any case would depend on the type of interference that was al-
leged. Nuisance was effectively split into two separate torts:
1. Tangible nuisance: If there were physical harm to property
(for example, damage to trees and shrubs) then it would be
necessary only to show that the harm had been caused by the
defendant's action and that some kind of harm was a fore-
seeable consequence of the defendant's action. In Fletcher
v. Rylands,48 the defendant had constructed a reservoir on
his property in order to power his mill, but the water escaped
into the plaintiffs mineshaft causing severe damage. Judge
Blackburn in the lower court asserted "that the person who
for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and
keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must
keep it in at his peril.,, 49 The result was to reaffirm the gen-
eral principle of sic utere tuo: if a defendant uses his prop-
erty in such a way that it might cause harm to another's and
if some harm in fact materializes, then defendant should be
liable for the harm. For ongoing instances of physical inter-
ference, there would of course be no need to show foresee-
ability.
2. Intangible nuisance: For interference with property that does
not result in physical injury to the property itself (for exam-
ple, a noxious smell), it would be necessary to evaluate
whether the interference was unreasonable in the circum-
stances. What is reasonable would depend, inter alia, on the
locality of the plaintiff (inhabitants of industrial areas must
48. (1866) L.R. 1-Ex. 265 (Blackburn), aff'd 3 L.R. 3 H.L. 330
(1868).
49. Id. at 279.
2003]
356 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL
expect more interference),5 ° the extent of the interference
(even in industrial areas, there are limits), 5' and the time of
day (a continuous loud noise made during the middle of the
night is considered less acceptable than the same during the
day). 52
RIPARIAN DOCTRINE IN FLUX
As to water cases, likewise, the law was in flux during the 19 th
century. Until the mid-nineteenth century, the owners of riparian
rights maintained an almost absolute right to the "natural flow" of
water.53 In Embrey v. Owen,54 a water abstraction case, Lord Parke
qualified that right: "The right to the benefit and advantage of the
water flowing past his land is not an absolute and exclusive right to
the flow of all water in its natural state ... but it is a right only to the
flow of water and the enjoyment of it subject to the similar rights of
all the proprietors of the banks on each side to the reasonable enjoy-
ment of the same gift of Providence." 55 Thus, an action could lie for
an unreasonable and unauthorized use of this common benefit.
By contrast, in Attorney General v. Birmingham Corporation,56 a
water pollution case decided in the same year as Hole, the court up-
held the right of a landowner "to enjoy the river ... in exactly the
same condition in which it flowed formerly." Meanwhile, in Stock-
port Waterworks v. Potter,57 decided in 1861, a printer who had
50. Bliss v. Hale [1838], 7 L.J.R. 122 (1838); Sturges v. Bridge-
man, 11 Eng. Rep. 852 (Ch. D. 1879).
51. R. v. Neville, 170 Eng. Rep. 102 (1791); Colls v. Home and
Colonial Stores, [1865] A.C. 179.
52. Id.
53. The rule was aqua currit, et debet curerer, ut solebat es juie
naturae ("water runs, and it should run, as it is used to run natu-
rally"). See H. Marlow Green, Common Law, Property Rights and
the Environment: A Comparative Analysis of Historical Develop-
ments in the United States and England and a Model for the Future,
30 CORNELL INT"L L.J. 541 (1997).
54. 155 Eng. Rep. 579, 586 (Ex. 1851).
55. Id.
56. 70 Eng. Rep. 220, 225 (1858).
57. 158 Eng. Rep. 433, 436 (1858).
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dumped arsenic in the water was found to have caused a nuisance in
part because he had failed to carry on his enterprise in a proper place
and in a reasonable manner. However, the Lords presiding over the
case were careful to distance themselves from Hole: "the public are
benefited by the carrying on of all trades ... But what answer is that
to an action by persons whose water for drinking is affected by arse-
nic poured into it by persons carrying on such a trade? 58
By 1867 a more explicit "balance of inconvenience" doctrine was
being espoused. In Lillywhite v. Trimmer,59 an action to restrain a
local Board of Health from discharging sewage, Malins VC noted: "
... if there is an important object to be effected, such as the drainage
of a town ... I cannot help thinking that these great and important
public objects are not wholly overlooked.,, 60 Although this doctrine
was never approved by the House of Lords, McLaren argues that it
was used with some discretion by lower court judges.
The House of Lords finally settled the issue in 1893. In the case
of Young and Co v. Bankier Distillery Co.,61 Lord McNaghten neatly
tied down the concept of reasonable use:
A riparian proprietor is entitled to have the water of the
stream, on the banks of which his property lies, flow
down as it has been accustomed to flow down to his
property, subject to the ordinary use of the flowing water
by upper proprietors, and to such further use, if any, on
their part in connection with their property as may be rea-
sonable under the circumstances. Every riparian owner
is thus entitled to the water of his stream, in its natural
flow, without sensible diminution or increase and without
sensible alteration in its character or quality.62
Reasonable use was thus defined by its effect on downstream us-
ers, and that effect was to be a marginal one at worst. Riparian doc-
trine has remained more or less unchanged since 1893.63
58. Id.
59. [1867] 36 U Ch. 525.
60. Id. at 528-529.
61. [1893] 69 LT 838.
62. Id. at 839.
63. Pride of Derby & Derbyshire Angling Club v. British Cela-
nese Ltd., 2 W.L.R. 58 (C.A. 1953).
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THE PROBLEM OF MULTIPLE SOURCES RECONSIDERED
In riparian cases, multiple sources have been held jointly liable for
harms. In Blair & Sumner v. Deakin,64 each contributor to a nuisance
was held liable for his contribution to the pollution, even though in-
dividually their actions would not have constituted a nuisance - this
is known as the combined effect rule.65 In the Pride of Derby An-
gling Club v. British Celanese,66 this was extended to cases where a
co-defendant has already admitted liability. Thus, a defendant D
will be held liable so long as he has contributed to a nuisance, even
though another defendant C has admitted liability and even though D
would not have committed a nuisance but for the actions of C.
67
The clarity of riparian rights was utilized in an innovative way by
John Eastwood KC, who in 1952 established the Anglers Co-
operative Association (ACA).6 8 The ACA acts to indemnify riparian
owners so that riparian users - especially anglers - are able to take
nuisance actions against polluters on behalf of the owners. 69 As
Roger Bate has shown, the ACA has successfully prosecuted thou-
sands of actions, using money obtained in damages and through bar-
gaining around injunctions to fight subsequent cases. 70
In air pollution cases, multiple sources may be held liable if their
actions result in physical damage. This was true of the area around
St Helen's, which was the site not only of a copper smelter (the St
Helen's Smelting Company) but also an Alkali manufacturer. In
spite of the high costs of legal action, the likely availability of dam-
ages for harm enabled the farmers living around St Helen's to obtain
compensation from the smelting company. Indeed, not only were
they able to obtain compensation from one of several polluters, they
were able to do so en masse, through William Rothwell, a land agent
64. [1887] 57 L.T.R. 522.
65. Howarth, supra note 10 at 486.
66. 2 W.L.R. 58 (C.A. 1953).
67. Id.
68. The ACA has since changed its name to the Anglers' Conser-
vation Association. Its acronym remains the same.
69. The right to support such an action through indemnity was
challenged unsuccessfully (with an allegation of "maintenance") in
Martell and Others v. Consett Iron Co. Ltd, [1955] 1 All E.R. 481.
70. Roger Bate, Saving our Streams, London: Institute of Eco-
nomic Affairs, 2002.
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and valuer in St. Helen's, who acted as arbitrator between the St.
Helen's Smelting Company and numerous farmers who were ad-
versely affected. In 1865, Mr. Tipping won an injunction against
the smelting company, which led to the closure of the plant and no
doubt put the various affected parties on a surer footing to bargain
with the alkali works.
72
Following the earlier Court of Appeal case, however, actionability
for interference with beneficial use, whether for single or multiple
sources, became dependent upon showing that the interference was
unreasonable in the circumstances. Since the most egregious forms
of multiple source air pollution in England's towns have declined to
relatively insignificant levels, 73 the remaining problems tend to be
precisely those that would be classified under "beneficial use" - they
do not for the most part cause physical damage to property but they
can be harmful to health and are certainly irritating to many. With
the greater uncertainty of success in bringing actions for interference
with beneficial use, however, it is perhaps unsurprising that an
equivalent of the ACA addressing air pollution has not emerged. 74
STATUTORY AUTHORITY
A significant barrier to effective private resolution of both air and
water pollution , especially pollution created by industry, is the de-
fense of statutory authority. In R. v. Pease, a railway was deemed
71. House of Lords Select Committee on Noxious Vapours, Par-
liamentary Papers, 14 (1862), Minutes of Evidence 21 QQ 220-2.
72. Tipping v. St. Helen's 11 Eng. Rep. 1483 (H.L. 1865).
73. For example, the ambient level of particulates and sulphur
dioxide in London is now lower than at any time since the 16t cen-
tury; meanwhile, nitrogen oxides and ozone have been falling since
the mid-1970s. See, e.g., BJORN LOMBORG, THE SKEPTICAL
ENVIRONMENTALIST, (2001).
74. In the mid-19th century a number of organizations were estab-
lished whose objective was to use the law to reduce air pollution.
However, these organizations tended to use the public nuisance ac-
tion and various clauses in Town Improvement Acts rather than pri-
vate nuisance. After a time, their main role seems to have been to
lobby Parliament to introduce stricter legislation. See, e.g., ERIC
ASHBY AND MARY ANDERSON, THE POLITICS OF CLEAN AIR (1981).
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not to have committed an alleged public nuisance by virtue of the
fact that it had been granted statutory authority to operate through a
private Act of Parliament and had been operated without negli-
gence.75  In Hammersmith and City Railway Co. v. Bush,76 the
House of Lords ruled that a railway operating under statutory author-
ity would not be held liable for any alleged private nuisance caused
to neighbouring properties resulting from its operations.
77
In the leading case of Allen v. Gulf Oil Refining,78 the owner of a
house allegedly adversely affected (through noise, smoke and other
interferences) resulting from the operation of a nearby oil refinery
was denied redress on the grounds that refinery operator had ob-
tained statutory authority to carry on its undertaking:
To the extent that the environment has been changed
from that of a peaceful unpolluted countryside to an in-
dustrial complex (as to which different standards apply:79
Parliament must be taken to have authorised it. So far, I
venture to think, the matter is not open to doubt. But in
my opinion the statutory authority extends beyond merely
authorising a change in the environment and an alteration
of standard. It confers immunity against proceedings for
any nuisance which can be shown ... to be the inevitable
result o erecting a refinery on the site, not, I repeat, the
existing refinery, but any refinery, however carefully and
with however great a regard for the interest of adjoining
occupiers it is sited, constructed and operated. To this ex-
tent and only to the extent that the actual nuisance (if
any) caused by the actual refinery and its operation ex-
ceeds that for which immunity is conferred, the plaintiff
has a remedy. 80
Thus, if a corporation has obtained, by an Act of Parliament, the
authority to carry on a particular operation, that corporation may not
be held liable for any nuisance that is the inevitable consequence of
75. [1832] 1 All E.R. 579.
76. [1869]4 H.L. 171.
77. Specifically, the court ruled that the Lands Clauses Consolida-
tion Act 1845 and the Railways Clauses Consolidation Act 1845
created a statutory right to carry on the operation of the railway.
78. [1981] 1 All E.R. 353.
79. See Sturges v. Bridgeman, [1879] 11 Ch. D. 852.
80. Id. at 857-858, per Lord Wilberforce.
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carrying on the operation. This is subject to the following qualifica-
tions:
1. The statutory powers must be exercised without "negligence"
- meaning that the work should be carried out with all reason-
able regard and care for the interests of other persons.
8 1
2. The statutory powers conferred are not merely permissive, in
which case they would have to be carried out in strict confor-
mity with private rights.82
3. The powers are conferred directly by parliament, not by an
administrative body responsible for implementing legislation.
So, for example, neither planning consent nor the granting of a
license necessary for operating certain classes of plant (such
as a landfill site) would confer statutory immunity from a suit
in nuisance.
83
BACK IN A HOLE?
As noted above, under the sic utere tuo rule, defendant would be
held liable if, in principle, harm to plaintiffs property was a likely
consequence of defendant's action and if in fact harm resulted.
Thus, even if defendant could not reasonably have foreseen the par-
ticular harm that might result, he remains liable. This is a rule of
strict liability and is to be contrasted with the rule in negligence, in
81. Hesketh v. Birmingham Corp [1924] 1 K.B. 260, (1922).
82. Asylum District Managers v. Hill [1881] 6 App Cas 193. But
c.f Manchester Corpn v. Famworth [1930] AC 171, 183 (the statu-
tory authority to operate a generating station was in general terms
and this was deemed sufficient to over-ride private rights: there
could be "no action for the making or doing of that thing if the nui-
sance if the inevitable result of the making or doing so authorised.").
83. Wheeler v. JJ Saunders Ltd., [1995] 2 All ER 697, planning
permission to operate piggery was deemed insufficient to grant im-
munity to nuisance suit for creating noxious smell. But c.f Gilling-
ham Borough Council v. Medway (Chatham) Dock Co Ltd., [1992]
3 All ER 923, in which planning permission to operate a commercial
port was deemed to be sufficient to grant immunity to nuisance suit
for increased noise, but in that case the planning permission was
granted for the reopening of an operation that had previously had
direct Parliamentary consent.
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which defendant is only liable if he could have foreseen with some
degree of precision the consequences of his action and if he had not
taken reasonable care to avoid any adverse consequences that were
foreseeable.
The rule for interference with beneficial use established in St.
Helen's v. Tipping - that the interference should be unreasonable in
the circumstances - appears at first sight closer to negligence. But
still the rule is distinguished by the fact that liability pertains not
according to the reasonableness of defendant's action, as in negli-
gence, but by the unreasonableness of the interference with plain-
tiffs right to peaceful enjoyment.
In spite of the clear difference between these concepts, the 2 0 th
Century saw a blurring of the distinction between nuisance and neg-
ligence. In part this arose from the introduction of a narrower re-
quirement of foreseeability in nuisance. Perhaps the most important
case is Wagon Mound (No 2), 84 which pertained to an accidental re-
lease of furnace oil into Sydney Harbour. The release, which oc-
curred while the oil was being loaded onto the Wagon Mound, a ship
on demise charter to Overseas Tankships (UK) Ltd, was followed by
several fires in which numerous ships were burnt. Two lengthy cases
resulted, the second of which is of particular relevance.
85
84. [1967] 1 A.C. 617.
85. The first case was heard by the Supreme Court of New South
Wales: Mort Dock and Engineering Company Ltd v. Overseas Tank-
ship (UK) Ltd (The "Wagon Mound") [1959] 2 Lloyd"s Rep 697;
This was appealed to the same court, see [1958] 1 Lloyd"s Rep 575,
and subsequently to the Privy Council. See [1961] AC 388. The case
was argued primarily on negligence and the Privy Council ruled that
the defendant was not negligent on the grounds that the particular
damage that ensued could not have been foreseen. The second case,
again heard by the Supreme Court of New South Wales, concerned
two other plaintiffs, The Miller Steamship Company, Pty., Ltd. v.
Overseas Tankship (U.K.), Ltd., and R. W. Miller & Co., Pty., Ltd.
v. Same (The "Wagon Mound" (No. 2)). [1963] 1 Lloyd's Rep 402.
This case was also appealed to the Privy Council. See [1967] 1 AC
617.
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Wagon Mound (No 2) was initially argued on three alternative
grounds: negligence, the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher,86 and nui-
sance. 87 In the Supreme Court of New South Wales, Judge Walsh
found that the claim in negligence failed because, although the de-
fendant had been careless, the damage was not reasonably foresee-
able. He found that the claim in Rylands v. Fletcher failed because
the use of a harbour by a ship is "natural use". And he also found
that the plaintiffs claim failed in private nuisance because there was
no interference with the use and enjoyment of the plaintiffs land.
However, he found that the plaintiff's claim succeeded in public nui-
sance, since the harbour is a public place.
The defendants then appealed the case in nuisance, while the plain-
tiffs appealed the case in negligence. The Privy Council held that
creating a danger to persons or property in navigable waters falls in
the class of public nuisance for which foreseeability of harm was
adjudged to be a requirement. The Judicial Committee was, how-
ever, careful to distinguish nuisance from negligence and to ensure
that not all forms of nuisance were lumped together.
However, there followed a rather ambiguous statement about the
requirement of "fault" and "foreseeability" in nuisance cases:
And although negligence may not be necessary, fault of
some kind is almost always necessary and fault generally
involves foreseeability, e.g. in cases like Sedleigh-
Denfield v. O"Callaghan88 the fault is in failing to abate
the nuisance of the existence of which the defender is or
ought to be aware as likely to cause damage to his
neighbour.89
In principle, this statement is broadly consistent with strict liability
- where "strict" is construed to mean that liability pertains to actions
for which a reasonable man should have foreseen that some harmful
consequence might result from his actions. This is the old nuisance
rule of sic utere tuo - so use your own as not to harm another's -
which implies that fault arises when one has insufficient regard for
the possible effects on others of one's actions.
86. At that time, the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher was considered a
separate tort pertaining to accidental damage resulting from land
uses that are "non-natural."
87. [1963] Lloyd's Rep 402.
88. [1940] 3 All ER 349.
89. [1967] 1 AC 617, 620.
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Having made the above arguments specifically in the context of
the case at hand and for the tort of public nuisance, the Privy Council
offered obiter the observation that "It could not be right to discrimi-
nate between different cases of nuisance so as to make foreseeability
a necessary element in determining damages in those cases where it
is a necessary element in determining liability, but not in others. So
the choice is between it being a necessary element in all cases of
nuisance or in none." 90
Worse than this non-sequitur, however, the Privy Council then
proceeded to assert that "the similarities between nuisance and other
forms of tort to which The Wagon Mound (No. 1) applies far out-
weigh any differences ... It is not sufficient that the injury suffered
by the respondents" vessels was the direct result of the nuisance if
that injury was in the relevant sense unforeseeable." 91 This is a rather
bizarre statement, given that the Privy Council in The Wagon Mound
(No. 1) had ruled that although there was no liability in negligence,
there might be liability in nuisance, precisely because different stan-
dards of foreseeability apply!
Notwithstanding the dubiousness of the reasoning underpinning
these obiter dicta in Wagon Mound (No 2), they were employed in
subsequent cases to justify a substantial blurring of the distinction
between nuisance and negligence. Consider Lord Wilberforce"s
judgement in the privy council decision of Goldman v. Hargrave,92
where he asserted that an occupier has duty to take reasonable steps
to prevent the spreading of a fire caused by lightning striking a
tree,93 failing to discriminate between nuisance and negligence:
So far it has been possible to consider the existence of a
duty, in general terms. But the matter cannot be left there
without some definition of the scope of his duty. How far
does it go? What is the standard of the effort required?
What is the position as regards expenditure? It is not
enough to say merely that these must be "reasonable",
since what is reasonable to one man may be very unrea-
sonable, and indeed ruinous, to another: the law must
take account of the fact that the occupier on whom the
duty is cast has, ex hypothesi, had this hazard thrust upon
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. [1967] 1 A.C. 645.
93. Id. at 663.
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him through no seeking or fault of his own. His interest,
and his resources, whether physical or material, may be
of a very modest character either in relation to the magni-
tude of the hazard, or as compared with those of his
threatened neighbour. A rule which required of him in
such unsought circumstances in his neighbour's interest a
physical effort of which he is not capable, or an excessive
expenditure of money, would be unenforceable or unjust.
One may say in general terms that the existence of a duty
must be based upon knowledge of the hazard, ability to
foresee the consequences of not checking or removing it,
and the ability to abate it. And in many cases, as, for ex-
ample, in Scrutton U's hypothetical case of stamping out
a fire, or the present case, where the hazard could have
been removed with little effort and no expenditure, no
problem arises. But other cases may not be so simple. In
such situations the standard ought to be to require of the
occupier what it is reasonable to expect of him in his in-
dividual circumstances. Thus, less must be expected of
the infirm than of the able-bodied: the owner of a small
property where a hazard arises which threatens a
neighbour with substantial interests should not have to do
so much as one with larger interests of his own at stake
and greater resources to protect them: if the small owner
does what he can and promptly calls on his neighbour to
provide additional resources, he may be held to have
done his duty: he should not be liable unless it is clearly
proved that he could, and reasonably in his individual cir-
cumstance should have done more. This approach to a
difficult matter is in fact that which the courts in their
more recent decisions have taken."
94
In Cambridge Water v. Eastern Counties Leather,95 the plaintiff, a
recently-privatised water company, alleged that the defendant, a
leather tannery had during the course of its operations spilled various
chemical solvents and that these had seeped into the plaintiff's bore-
hole rendering the water unusable. The case was complicated by
several factors, including (1) the procedures employed by the tan-
nery which had resulted in the spillage had ceased some years before
94. Id. at 656-657.
95. 1 All E.R. 53 (1994).
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the alleged injury had come to light; (2) the concentration of the sol-
vents present in the bore-hole water when the case came to court
were within statutory limits when the spillage occurred but the statu-
tory limits were lowered as a result of the implementation of the
EC's Groundwater Directive. Lord Goff asserted:
Of course, although liability for nuisance has generally
been regarded as strict, at least in the case of a defendant
who has been responsible for the creation of a nuisance,
even so that liability has been kept under control by the
principle of reasonable user - the principle of give and
take as between neighbouring occupiers of land, under
which "those acts necessary for the common and ordinary
use and occupation of land and houses may be don, if
conveniently done, without subjecting those who do them
to an action." The effect is that, if the user is reasonable,
the defendant will not be liable for consequent harm to
his neighbour's enjoyment of his land; but if the user is
not reasonable, the defendant will be liable even though
he may have exercised reasonable care and skill to avoid
it.
96
He went on to suggest that this "reasonable user" principle is simi-
lar to the "natural user" doctrine developed under the rule in Rylands
v. Fletcher. This latter point is perhaps true, but by omitting from
the concept of reasonable user the caveat that the actions should be
done "conveniently" - a key element of Bradford v. Turnley - liabil-
ity for nuisance under Goff's "reasonable user" shifts dramatically
away from the sic utere tuo rule that had been supported wholeheart-
edly by Baron Bramwell in Bradford v. Turnley. The extent of the
shift is clear in Goff's elaboration of the concept of foreseeability in
nuisance. Citing as authority the obiter dicta of the Privy Council in
Wagon Mound (No 2), in which foreseeability of harm of the rele-
vant kind was considered essential to establishing liability in both
public and private nuisance, Lord Goff asserts that "It is widely ac-
cepted that ... forseeability of harm is indeed a prerequisite of the
recovery of damages in private nuisance, as in the case of public nui-
96. Cambridge Water Co Ltd v. Eastern Counties Leather, PLC. 1
All E.R. 53 at 299, (quoting Bradford v. Turnley, [1862] 3 B. & S.
62, 83).
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sance." 97 He then went on to consider the issue of forseeability in
Rylands v. Fletcher and came to the same conclusion.
98
In Hunter v. Canary Wharf Ltd.,99 a case of alleged interference
with the beneficial use of property resulting from dust and from the
blocking of television reception, Lord Goff repeated the observation
in Cambridge Water and then proceeded to claim that negligence has
effectively replaced nuisance as the cause of action for harm result-
ing from smoke:
If the occupier of land suffers personal injury as a result
of inhaling the smoke, he may have a cause of action in
negligence. But he does not have a cause of action in nui-
sance for his personal injury, nor for interference with his
personal enjoyment. 100
Remember that Bamford v. Turnley was a case of smoke nuisance
resulting from the operation of a brick kioln. Remember also that in
Bamford v. Turnley, the incipient shift away from the sic utere tuo
rule, begun with Hole v. Barlow, was expressly overruled. Yet, Lord
Goff asserts that smoke does not constitute such a nuisance. Even if
one reads the passage narrowly so that it is construed to apply only
to personal injury it is peculiar: why should personal injury not be a
form of interference with beneficial use?
For continuing nuisances, the requirement of forseeability is less
onerous, even if the nuisance is the result of a defendant's neglect
rather than any positive action. issue was addressed in Sedleigh-
Denfield v. O'Callaghan.1° 1 In that case, a pipe was placed on the
defendant's land by a trespasser. The defendants subsequently used
the pipe to drain their land. However, during the course of a heavy
rainstorm the pipe became blocked with leaves and water over-
flowed on to the plaintiff's property. The plaintiff sued the defen-
dant for nuisance. The lower court ruled tat the defendant had not
created the nuisance and so was under no duty to abate it. The Court
of Appeal upheld this judgment. However, the House of Lords re-
versed the judgement. The defendant not only had knowledge of the
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. 2 All E.R. 426, (1997).
100. See id. per Lord Goff.
101. [1940] AC 880.
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pipe but he used it: he therefore both adopted and continued the nui-
sance. 102
In Davey v. Harrow Corporation, tree roots had grown from de-
fendant's property onto that of the plaintiff causing physical damage
the plaintiffs property. The Judge in the lower court found for the
defendant on the grounds that ownership of the trees had not been
clearly established. The Court of Appeal reversed the decision,
holding that the owner of a property on which a tree stands and from
which roots grow is liable for damage caused by those roots, regard-
less of whether the owner planted the trees or not.
The issue was again addressed in Leakey and Others v. National
Trust, 10 3 which concerned a landslide from the defendants" property
onto that of the plaintiffs. In the summer of 1976, during a pro-
longed drought, cracjks had opened up in the earth on the defendants
property and one of the plaintiffs had complained to the defendant
about the imminent risk of a landslide possibly affecting her prop-
erty. The defendants replied that they were not obliged to do any-
thing about it and soon thereafter a landslide occurred resulting in
damage to the plaintiffs' property. The plaintiffs then asked the de-
fendant to remove the earth, but the defendant refused, and the plain-
tiffs removed the earth at their own expense. The plaintiffs sued the
defendant to recover the cost of removing the earth and damages for
nuisance. The Defendants appealed arguing: (1) that there was no
liability for things that naturally accumulate on land, and (2) that
even if there was liability it was in negligence and not nuisance. On
the first point, the Court of Appeal upheld the lower court judgment,
affirming the decision in Davey v. Harrow Corporation that the
owner of a property is liable even for things naturally upon his land.
On the second point, the Court of Appeal (per Lords Justice Megaw
and Cumming- Bruce) ruled that this was clearly a case of nuisance.
The issue was addressed most recently by the House of Lords in
the case of Delaware Mansions Ltd. v. Westminster City Council. 104
The case was similar to Davey v. Harrow Corporation: the plaintiff
had suffered physical damage to its property as a result of tree roots
egressing from the defendant's. Again the House of Lords ruled that
this was a case of nuisance, however the reasoning given was based
102. Id.
103. Leakey and Others v. National Trust for Places of Historic
Interest or Natural History, [1980] Q.B.485.
104. [2002] 1 A.C. 321.
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on considerations of "reasonableness between neighbours" and rea-
sonable foreseeability," per Lord Cooke. In the case at hand, for ex-
ample, it was considered necessary for the plaintiff to have given
notice to the defendant of the continuing nuisance.
The present status of nuisance may be summarized as follows:
Where D's actions have caused physical injury to P's property or
interfered with P's beneficial use of her property, D will be liable
only if P can show that D could have foreseen harm of the relevant
type resulting from D's actions. But even so, the interference will
not be an actionable nuisance if it relates only to injury to the person.
However, where a nuisance has been continued or is ongoing, and is
evident to D - or where P has given notice of its existence to D - the
foreseeability requirement is presumed to be fulfilled.
CLIMBING OUT OF THE HOLE
Notwithstanding the availability of remedies in other causes of ac-
tion (most notably negligence), the above analysis indicates that the
following amendments would improve the utility of nuisance law as
a means of addressing environmental problems.
1. Generally follow the late nineteenth century doctrine, which
for an actionable private nuisance would entail establishing:
a. Interference with another's right
i. for physical damage to property this would
merely require showing that harm has occurred.
ii. for interference with beneficial use of property,
this would require showing that the interference
was "unreasonable" in the circumstances (as
judged by that wonderful legal fiction, the rea-
sonable man); reasonableness in this context
would be dependent principally on the extent of
the interference, the location of the P, the time
the interference occurred, and the duration of
the interference.
This distinction between physical interference and interfer-
ence with beneficial use may be justified a number of ways.
Perhaps the most satisfactory justification being that it ac-
cords with the common law's general predilection for clear,
objectively verifiable in itself. By contrast, interference with
beneficial use is inherently subjective (just as one man's meat
20031
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is another man's poison, so too one woman's irritating, rum-
bling train is another woman's pleasurable vibro-massage).
Probably the only way to make the interference with benefi-
cial use rule objective would be to make all forms of interfer-
ence actionable (which is little more than a "lonely rural fan-
tasy". 10 5) Thus, a rule based on the principles of reasonable-
ness outlined above seems about as close to an objective stan-
dard as one could reasonably hope for.
b. Cause: that the interference with P's right had in fact
resulted from D's actions. However, it should not be
necessary to show that the harm resulted uniquely from
D's actions, or indeed that D's actions would have re-
sulted in harm but for the actions of another. It should
only be necessary to show that D's actions contributed,
in the circumstances, to the interference.
c. Foreseeability and fault: liability is strict; it is enough
that D has done something likely to interfere with an-
other's property. It does not matter that the specific in-
terference itself is unforeseeable. The test is whether a
"reasonable man" should have foreseen some potential
interference. 106 It does not matter that D took every care
to ensure that his operation was conducted in compli-
ance with industry standards.
2. Cases of injury to persons or property that occur in places con-
trolled directly by the state (e.g. public highways, public wa-
terways, and so on) should be governed by separate rules. The
reason is simply that the activities in such places are not sub-
ject to the same sphere of control that pertains in private
spaces. It is, for example, not usually possible to enter into a
contract with the state to prevent persons walking past one's
building while one is erecting an extension to one's property.
Perhaps the solution in such cases is for the state to be liable
under the same rules as apply in private nuisance. So, in
105. Howarth, supra note 10, at 505.
106. The rule is sic utere tuo ut in alienum non laedas, which
means that D should have regard to the effects of his actions on oth-
ers, so as not to cause harm, and also "that the person who for his
own purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps there any-
thing likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril."
Rylands v. Fletcher [1866], 1 L. R. Ex. 265, 279.
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Wagon Mound, the state of New South Wales might have
been held liable for permitting fuel to be loaded in its harbour
in such a way that it could leak and cause injury to other
boats.'1 7
3. Constrain or Remove the defense of statutory authority. At
present this is one of the single most significant barriers to the
use of private nuisance for environmental protection.'
°8
Perhaps the best approach, however, to this is that adumbrated by
Lord Denning in the Court of Appeal decision in Allen v. Gulf Oil:
But I venture to suggest that modem statutes should be con-
strued on a new principle. Wherever private undertakers seek
statutory authority to construct and operate an installation
which may cause damage to people living in the neighbour-
hood, it should not be assumed that Parliament intended that
damage should be done to innocent people without redress. Just
as in principle property should not be taken compulsorily except
on proper compensation being paid for it, so also in principle
property should not be damaged compulsorily except on proper
compensation being made for the damage done. No matter
whether the undertakers use due diligence or not, they ought not
to be allowed, for their own profit, to damage innocent people
or property without paying compensation. They ought to pro-
vide for it as part of the legitimate expenses of their operation,
either as initial capital cost or out of the subsequent revenue. 
109
Remove the more general defence of public benefit, which com-
pels judges to make impossible calculations (weighing up, to use the
example from the introduction, the interests of road users, industrial-
ists, and sunset worshippers against the interests of those adversely
affected by emissions). To the extent that "public benefit" is of rele-
107. At the very least this might encourage the state to reconsider
the merits of owning such a large proportion of the infrastructure. If
the harbour had been owned by a private party, that party could have
specified the liability rules to apply in his contracts with those using
the harbour, thereby avoiding lengthy and expensive tort cases (and
one would hope not substituting them with lengthy and expensive
cases for breach of contract).
108. Allen v. Gulf Oil Refining, Ltd., [1979] 3 All E.R. 1008,
1012, per Lord Denning.
109. Allen v. Gulf Oil Refining Ltd. [1979] 3 All E.R. 1008,
[1979] 3 W.L.R. 523 [1980] R.V.R. 126 per Lord Denning.
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vance, it is incorporated into the locality criterion. Moreover, if the
benefit of continuing a nuisance is sufficiently great, then in some
cases the defendant may be able to buy out the plaintiff(s). 1 0
4. Propose that harm to human health be covered as an interfer-
ence with beneficial use, actionable by the possessor of the af-
fected property, P. It seems reasonable, for example, to pro-
pose that air emissions which contribute to asthma or other
respiratory problems should be presumed to interfere with
beneficial use and that P should be able to avail herself of an
action in nuisance for abatement."l ' Combined with better
scientific understanding of the causes of these problems and
with better monitoring techniques, enabling readier and
cheaper identification of the sources of pollution, such a pre-
sumption would offer a means of dealing with modem air pol-
lution problems.' 12
5. In case there is any confusion, the primary remedy for con-
tinuing nuisances should be the injunction. Whereas in some
cases courts may be able accurately to assess damages for past
nuisances, it seems extremely unlikely that they will be able to
assess damages for future nuisances, making the injunction a
more appropriate remedy from the perspective of protecting
the rights of those who are adversely affected." 3 Moreover,
in cases where many people are adversely affected, an injunc-
tion brought by one party would effectively protect the rights
110. As noted above, there is evidence of such bargaining taking
place, however in a recent study Ward Farnsworth found no evi-
dence of bargaining. Ward Farnsworth, Do Parties to Nuisance
Cases Bargain After Judgment? A Glimpse Inside the Cathedral, 66
U. CH. L. REV. 373 (1999).
111. This proposition is in direct contradiction of the current law:
"If the occupier of land suffers personal injury as a result of inhaling
the smoke, he may have a cause of action in negligence. But he does
not have a cause of action in nuisance for his personal injury, nor for
interference with his personal enjoyment." Hunter v. Canary Wharf,
Ltd., [1997] 2 WLR 684, 699 per Lord Goff.
112. Even pollution from vehicles could be dealt with in this way
by holding the state liable as maintainer of the highway on which
those vehicles traverse.
113. See Stephen Tromans, Nuisance - Prevention or Payment, 41
CAMBRIDGE L. J. 87 (1982).
[VOL. XIV
CLIMBING OUT OF THE HOLE
of many and thereby protect the environment as a whole.
Such a reformation of nuisance law seems to offer at least a
partial solution.
Such a reformulation of nuisance law seems to offer at least a par-
tial solution to the conundrum posed in the introduction. By clearly
delineating rights and responsibilities this way, people will be able to
choose the kind of environment they want. Meanwhile environ-
mental organizations might follow the ACA model and indemnify
parties who seek to sue polluters, rather than push for more stringent
environmental regulation. Indeed, there might be a move to repeal
the entire body of environmental legislation, which would soon be-
gin to look cumbersome, expensive, and counterproductive. 1
4
114. Cf. Robert Cutting, One Man's Ceilin' is Another Man's
Floor: Property Rights as the Double Edged Sword, 31 ENVTL. L.
819 (2001) (if property rights advocates truly acknowledged the re-
sponsibilities and the rights of property owners, the remainder of the
body of environmental law as we know it might actually become
unnecessary).
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